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During the 1850-1920 period the US experienced a mass inﬂow of immigrants
– more than 30 million people migrated from Europe to the US – with the
average annual immigration inﬂow rate measuring about 0.75 percent of the
total US population (Hatton and Williamson, 1998). We exploit in this paper
this historically unique inﬂow of immigrants to the US to study the eﬀects
that changes in the cultural composition of the US population had on output
growth. Because immigrants came from diﬀerent European countries, the mass
immigration wave not only aﬀected the overall share of foreign-born in the
US. It also aﬀected signiﬁcantly the diversity of the working and voting-age
population.1
A fairly large and by now well-established literature has investigated the
eﬀects of cultural diversity on economic growth in the cross-section of coun-
tries.2 Our aim is to contribute to this literature in two main dimensions. First,
our empirical analysis is based on comparing how within-county changes in cul-
tural fragmentation aﬀect within-county changes in output. Because we use in
the estimation exclusively the within-county variation of the data, our empir-
ical analysis circumvents an often made critique of the cross-country growth
literature that in the cross-section there are many diﬃcult-to-measure omitted
variables, such as history and geography, that aﬀect both economic growth and
the cultural fragmentation of the population. Second, we address the impor-
tant issue of identifying the causal eﬀect that cultural diversity has on economic
growth by using the supply-push component of immigrant inﬂows as an instru-
mental variable. The supply-push component of immigrant inﬂows is a widely
used instrumental variable in the labor economics literature (see e.g. Card and
DiNardo, 2000; Card, 2001, 2009; Saiz, 2003; Ottaviano and Peri, 2005, 2006)
and has not been used before to examine at the US county level the eﬀects that
cultural diversity had on output growth during the age of mass migration.
On the theoretical front, the cultural economics literature has suggested sev-
eral potentially countervailing channels through which cultural diversity aﬀects
output growth. Cultural diversity can have a positive eﬀect on output growth
if a more diverse working-age population is associated with a greater variety
of skills that in turn enable the production of a greater variety of goods and
services (Alesina and La Ferrera, 2005). A more diverse, and in particular, a
more polarized population can however also have a detrimental eﬀect on output
growth if it is associated with increased social conﬂict and a reduction in the
quality and quantity of public good provision (Alesina et al., 1999; Montalvo
and Reynal-Querol, 2005a,b). We examine these countervailing eﬀects by con-
structing measures of cultural fractionalization and cultural polarization. While
our measure of cultural fractionalization is linearly increasing in the number of
groups, our measure of cultural polarization is maximized when two groups are
1See for example, Cohn (2010), Hatton and Williamson (1998), or Kim (2007) and the
references therein for further information on the history of immigration to the US.
2See for example, Mauro (1995), Easterly and Levine (1997), Alesina et al. (2003), or
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2003, 2005a).
1of equal size. Our polarization measure is therefore closely related to Horowitz’s
(1985) statement that conﬂicts are more likely in societies where a large ethnic
minority faces an ethnic majority. Conﬂict models such as those in Lane and
Tornell (1996, 1999), Esteban and Ray (1999, 2010), and Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol (2005a) formalize the non-monotonic relationship between diversity and
potential conﬂict emphasized by Horowitz (1985) and predict that social ten-
sions are greatest when there are two equally powerful groups that contest for
resources. We expect our polarization measure therefore to capture relative to
the fractionalization measure more the social conﬂict eﬀect than the production
diversity eﬀect.
Our ﬁrst main ﬁnding is that increases in the cultural fractionalization of
US counties during the 1870-1920 period led to signiﬁcant increases in output
per capita. State-ﬁxed eﬀects estimates yield that on average a 1 percentage
point increase in cultural fractionalization increased output per capita by up
to 2.3 percent. This is a sizable eﬀect. Consistent with the results in Alesina
and La Ferrera (2005) we also ﬁnd that the positive eﬀect of fractionalization
on output growth is particularly large in counties with above-median GDP per
capita. In these counties a 1 percentage point increase in cultural fractionaliza-
tion increased output per capita by up to 4.2 percent.
As an intermediate channel to link our ﬁrst main result more closely to the
cultural economics literature – where a key argument for a positive eﬀect of cul-
tural fractionalization on output per capita is increased product variety (product
diversity channel) – we show that increases in the cultural fractionalization of
counties were associated with signiﬁcant increases in the occupational diversity
of workers.3 We construct a fractionalization index of worker occupation and
show that changes in this index were signiﬁcantly positively aﬀected by changes
in the cultural fractionalization of counties. Consistent with the product diver-
sity channel, we also ﬁnd that increases in cultural fractionalization led to a
greater variety of agricultural goods.
Our second main ﬁnding is that increases in cultural polarization had a sig-
niﬁcant negative eﬀect on output per capita. A state-ﬁxed eﬀects estimate yields
that a 1 percentage point increase in cultural polarization decreased output per
capita by around 2.5 percent. We provide an explanation for this negative eﬀect
of cultural polarization on output by documenting that increases in the cultural
polarization of counties were associated with a signiﬁcant increase in the frac-
tion of people employed in jobs related to crime delicts. We also document that
increases in cultural polarization led to a signiﬁcant increase in the number of
riots. Our ﬁnding of a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of cultural polarization on the
fraction of people employed in crime related jobs and a signiﬁcant positive ef-
fect of cultural polarization on the number of riots is consistent with the conﬂict
literature that has emphasized the conﬂict promoting eﬀects of cultural polar-
ization (e.g. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2003, 2005a,b, 2008; Esteban and
Ray, 1999, 2010 and Esteban et al., 2010).
3Our ﬁnding is in line with Kim (2007), who provides descriptive evidence that immigration
and the diversity of the workforce are positively related.
2An additional contribution of our paper is that our state-ﬁxed eﬀects esti-
mates reveal a signiﬁcant reversion of counties’ cultural fractionalization and
cultural polarization index to the mean. Statistically, this mean reversion fol-
lows from the bounded nature of the polarization and fractionalization index on
the unit interval. The signiﬁcant mean-reversion in the cultural fractionalization
and polarization index implies that, in a reduced form regression of economic
growth on initial fractionalization and polarization the estimated coeﬃcients
reﬂect the opposite of the true eﬀect that a within-county change in cultural
fractionalization and polarization has on within-county output changes. This is
because counties with an initially high level of cultural fractionalization and po-
larization experienced subsequently smaller changes than counties with initially
low levels. Hence, using initial values of fractionalization and polarization to
examine how a change in the cultural fragmentation of the population induces
a change in output per capita requires to deal correctly with the mean-reverting
time-series nature of the cultural fractionalization and polarization indices. We
show that this can be done by using an IV approach where the change in frag-
mentation is instrumented by the initial level of fragmentation. Via the ﬁrst-
stage regression the IV approach fully takes into account the mean-reversion
in cultural fractionalization and polarization. Importantly, we ﬁnd that our
main results continue to hold when using this alternative instrumental variables
approach which exploits the cross-county variation in initial conditions.
Methodologically, our empirical analysis is most closely related to Ottaviano
and Peri’s (2006) work on the economic value of cultural diversity in US cities.
Ottaviano and Peri tackle endogeneity problems by using, as we do, the iden-
tiﬁcation strategy from Card (2001) and Saiz (2003) to construct the predicted
change of the number of immigrants from each country in each US city between
1970 to 1990 based on immigration network eﬀects (i.e. the supply-push com-
ponent). Consistent with our results, Ottaviano and Peri ﬁnd that increases in
the cultural fractionalization of cities has a positive eﬀect on productivity.4
Our empirical analysis diﬀers from the work of Ottaviano and Peri in two
main aspects. First, Ottaviano and Peri focus on cultural fractionalization only
and do not examine the eﬀects of cultural polarization. Our estimates show that
increases in cultural polarization have a signiﬁcant negative output eﬀect while
increases in cultural fractionalization have a signiﬁcant positive output eﬀect.
The empirical ﬁndings in our paper therefore highlight the importance of distin-
guishing between cultural fractionalization and cultural polarization. They echo
the theoretical literature that has emphasized diﬀerent channels through which
cultural diversity can aﬀect economic activity. In Appendix A1 we also present
anecdotal evidence on these countervailing eﬀects of cultural polarization and
cultural fractionalization to further illustrate our empirical ﬁndings.
4In complementary work, Ottaviano and Peri (2005) show that employment density and
wages of US-born workers are signiﬁcantly higher in US cities with a higher linguistic frac-
tionalization. More recently, Sparber (2009, 2010) shows with decennial panel data that racial
fractionalization has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on wages in most of the US industries and
cities for the 1980-2000 period. Peri (2010) shows for the 1970-2006 period that immigration
had a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on total factor productivity in US states.
3A second key diﬀerence between Ottaviano and Peri and our empirical anal-
ysis is the time period covered. Ottaviano and Peri focus on the 1970-1990
period while we focus on the period from 1870-1920. There are several reasons
why focusing on the 1870-1920 period has advantages. First, in contrast to
the 1970-1990 period, the 1870-1920 period was a period of free immigration.
Illegal immigration was therefore not an issue due to the very liberal US immi-
gration policy before 1920. Second, immigration during the 1870-1920 period
changed signiﬁcantly the demographic structure of the US population. Between
1870-1920, the annual inﬂow rate of immigrants peaked in some years around
1.5 percent, a value which was never reached again in the 20th century (see
Figure 1). Finally, from a historical perspective, the period of mass migration
constituted the ﬁrst large inﬂow of immigrants to the US.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief
overview and discussion of the age of mass migration. Section 3 describes the
construction of our cultural fractionalization and cultural polarization index.
Section 4 discusses the estimation strategy. Section 5 presents our main results.
Section 6 examines the issues of group aggregation and the measurability of
inter-group distances. The last section concludes.
2 The Age of Mass Migration in the US: A Nat-
ural Source of Cultural Variation
During the age of mass migration, which is commonly referred to as the period
between 1850 to World War I, about 55 million Europeans emigrated to North
and South America and Australasia. The US received about three-ﬁfth of the 55
million European immigrants, and thus the bulk of the large immigration stream
(Hatton and Williamson, 1998). In general, between 1850 and 1920, emigrants
from non-European countries (like China, Japan and Mexico) constituted only
a minor part of the overall immigration wave to the US (see e.g. Cohn, 2010).
One important and key aspect of the age of mass migration is that it was a
period of free immigration. Despite the Chinese exclusion act in 1882, immigra-
tion policy remained liberal for the overwhelming European part of immigrants
until the introduction of a literacy test in 1917 (Immigration Act of 1917) and the
establishment of immigration quotas in 1921 (Emergency Quota Act of 1921).5
The 1850-1920 immigration inﬂow was therefore a natural source of variation
in cultural diversity. It stands in contrast to the post-1920 US immigration
inﬂows, which were strongly aﬀected by US immigration policy.
We focus in our empirical analysis on the period 1870 to 1920, rather than on
the whole 1850 to 1920 period for two main reasons. First, we wanted to leave
out the 1861-1865 civil war. The 1861-1865 civil war was an atypically large,
negative shock to the US economy that could have aﬀected both the cultural
5See Goldin (1994) for an excellent analysis of the political economy of immigration re-
strictions in the United States, 1890 to 1921.
4diversity and development of US counties diﬀerently.6 Second, we take 1920
as the terminal point because at the turn of the 1920s there was a signiﬁcant
change in US immigration policy. As Goldin (1994, p. 223) notes: "With the
passage of the Emergency Quota Act in May 1921 the era of open immigration
to the United States came to an abrupt end".
Figure 1 shows that during the 1870-1920 period the annual inﬂow rate of
immigrants was about 0.75 percent of the total US population. This is a fairly
large inﬂow rate, in particular when compared to the post-1920 period where
among other factors immigration restrictions signiﬁcantly reduced the inﬂow
rate of immigrants to about 0.20 percent.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the share of foreign-born in the total
US population during the 1870-1920 period. On average, more than 10 percent
of the US population were foreign-born. The West had the largest share of
foreign-born (19 percent), followed by the Midwest (15 percent), the Northeast
(15 percent), and the South (2 percent). The descriptive statistics show also
that not only is there substantial variation in the foreign-born share across US
counties – the across-county standard deviation of the foreign born share is 0.11.
The share of foreign-born changed also signiﬁcantly within counties (the within-
county standard deviation is 0.04). Because the population in the US more than
doubled between 1870-1920, in order to keep the share of foreign-born constant
at 10 percent the absolute number of immigrants had to increase (see e.g. Barde
et al., 2006).
It is also interesting to note that during the age of mass migration the
geographic origin of the immigrants varied substantially over time. Around
1870, most of the immigrants were from Ireland, Germany, Great Britain, and
Scandinavia. These countries remained until the end of the 19th century very
important emigration nations. At the end of the 19th century, however, the
bulk of immigrants came from Eastern and Southern Europe including countries
like Italy, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Poland, Russia, Spain or Portugal
and replaced Scandinavia, Germany, Ireland and Great Britain as the most
important immigration nations in the US (see e.g. Barde et al. 2006, Cohn,
2010, or Hatton and Williamson, 1998). This geographical shift of immigration
from Western and Northern Europe to Southern and Eastern Europe resulted in
a remarkable variation of the cultural composition of the US county population
between 1870 and 1920. We explain in the next section how we calculated
indices of cultural fractionalization and cultural polarization to capture these
substantial changes in the cultural diversity of US counties.
6Furthermore, we start our empirical analysis in 1870 because the US Census collected
systematical information about the foreign-born’s country of origin from 1870 onwards only
(see the Data Appendix A3 for further information).
53 Two Diﬀerent Concepts of Cultural Diversity:
Fractionalization and Polarization
We use the country of origin deﬁned by the US Census to measure diﬀerent
cultural groups and to construct our indices of cultural diversity. In contrast
to ethno-linguistic or religious fragmentation indices that distinguish among
diﬀerent races, linguistic, or religious characteristics of individuals, our indices
are based on the country of origin of individuals and this has the key advantage
that our indices are based on well-deﬁned units. We construct an index of
cultural fractionalization as





where i;cs is the county population share of group i living in county c of state
s. The N groups are: US-born whites, Afro-Americans, foreign-born from the
Austro-Hungarian Empire (Austria, Bohemia and Hungary), the Benelux (Hol-
land, Luxembourg, Belgium), Canada, Central and South America, Scandinavia
(Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland), Eastern Europe, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom (England, Scotland and Wales).7 Conceptually, the fractionalization
index captures the probability that two randomly selected individuals are from
diﬀerent cultural groups. In general, the fractionalization index is one minus
the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman index and has the property that it increases mono-
tonically in the number of groups. Due to the common use of the Herﬁndahl-
Hirschman index in the industrial organization literature, the fractionalization
index should be well suited to test whether there is a beneﬁt from cultural diver-
sity inherent in the production process or in the supply of diﬀerent consumption
goods.
To capture the degree of social tensions, we construct a measure of cultural
polarization as








Our polarization measure follows Reynal-Querol (2002) and Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol (2005b) and captures formally how far the distribution of the cultural
groups is from the bipolar distribution.8 The measure is therefore maximized
when there are two groups which are of equal size. Note that the polarization
index that we use is based on the binary criteria of "belonging" or "not belong-
ing" to a particular cultural group. Using such a discrete metric (belonging/not
7See also the Data Appendix A3 for further details.
8For further details on the theoretical properties of a discrete polarization measure see
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2008).
6belonging) implies that the distance across ethnic groups is the same. Hence,
what matters for our index of polarization is only the size of each group and
not the distance between groups.9 Given the work by the conﬂict literature on
polarization the polarization index seems a proper tool to analyze the economic
consequences of potential conﬂicts among cultural groups in the US.
Figures 2A and 2B show scatter plots of the polarization and fractional-
ization index. Figure 2A shows a scatter plot for the 1870 period and Figure
2B shows a scatter plot for 1920 period. Both scatter plots show an inverted
U-shaped relationship. For low values of fractionalization the relationship is
positive, for intermediate values the relationship is zero, and for high values of
fractionalization the relationship is negative. Hence, the correlation between the
polarization and fractionalization index is low when the cultural heterogeneity
is high.10
To show that there was also signiﬁcant variation in fractionalization and po-
larization over time, Table 2 provides summary statistics of the fractionalization
and polarization index for the 1870 and 1920 period. Interestingly, both frac-
tionalization and polarization declined in the US on average. But the change in
fractionalization and polarization diﬀered substantially across regions. In the
Northeast both polarization and fractionalization increased, while in the West,
the Mid-West, and the South polarization and fractionalization decreased.
4 Estimation Strategy
We estimate the eﬀects that cultural fractionalization and polarization have on
output per capita using a ﬁrst-diﬀerence approach which relates the 1870-1920
change in output per capita Y cs of US county c in state s to the 1870-1920
change in fractionalization FRACcs and polarization POLcs:
Y cs = s + FRACcs + POLcs +  0Xcs;1870 + ucs: (1)
As a baseline we estimate equation (1) by least squares. The state ﬁxed eﬀects
s capture factors that vary over time at the state-level (such as for example
economic and social policy choices made by the state government) and aﬀect
both output per capita and the cultural diversity of the population. Note that
because we estimate equation (1) in ﬁrst diﬀerences, time-invariant factors (such
as for example geography) that aﬀect both output per capita and cultural di-
versity are diﬀerenced out.
On theoretical grounds, we cannot rule out that changes in output per capita
of counties had no systematic eﬀects on their cultural diversity. For example,
9In Section 6.2 we also discuss results for an alternative index that attempts to capture
distances between groups.
10In Appendix Figure 1 we provide further intuition on the relationship between the frac-
tionalization and polarization index by simulating data and plotting the relationship between
the fractionalization and polarization index for diﬀerent group numbers (see also Appendix
A2 for further details).
7counties that experienced a large increase in output per capita may appear
particularly attractive to immigrants, causing an inﬂow of immigrants. It is
also possible that due to demand eﬀects counties which grew a lot demanded
a more diverse workforce. In this case, least-squares estimation of equation (1)
will produce biased estimates.
To address the concern that the least-squares estimates are biased due to a
reverse causal eﬀect of economic growth on cultural diversity we use instrumen-
tal variables techniques. Our ﬁrst instrumental variables approach follows the
labor economics literature and uses the so-called supply-push inﬂow of immi-
grants as an instrumental variable. For the 1870-1920 period, we compute the
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wide growth rate of the foreign-born share from European country i between
1870-1920. The identiﬁcation strategy therefore exploits that newly arriving
immigrants tend to settle in regions where previous immigrants from the same
country already live (see e.g. Bartel, 1989, Munshi, 2003 or Boustan, 2010).
Because we use the initial, that is, the 1870 distribution of immigrants across
the US counties to predict the inﬂow of immigrants during the 1870-1920 pe-
riod the supply-push variable is exogenous to demand shocks that occur over
the 1870-1920 period in US counties. The imputed foreign-born share, b 1920
i;cs , is
calculated as b 1920
i;cs = (1+7020
i )1870
i;cs . Because the fractionalization and polar-
ization index are functions of 2
i;cs and 3
i;cs we use the change in the quadratic
and cubic terms of the imputed foreign-born shares as instrumental variables
for the change in the fractionalization and polarization index.
Our second instrumental variables approach exploits that there is signiﬁcant
reversion of the fractionalization and polarization index to the mean. The sig-
niﬁcant mean-reversion in the fractionalization and polarization index implies
that we can use the initial 1870 values as instrumental variables to predict the
1870-1920 change. Because the initial values are predetermined the instruments
are plausibly exogenous to future changes in output per capita.
We note that even though our predetermined instruments are well suited
to address reverse causality bias, they may not be so well suited to address
omitted variables bias. We therefore made an eﬀort to address omitted vari-
ables bias in our estimation strategy as much as possible by including in the
regression state ﬁxed eﬀects as well as a rich set of county-speciﬁc initial control
variables Xcs;1870. The set of county-speciﬁc initial control variables includes
amongst others the (1870) level of GDP per capita, the Gini coeﬃcient on land
inequality, the manufacturing share, and an indicator variable for railway access.
Including these initial control variables on the right-hand side of the estimating
equation should increase the likelihood that our predetermined instruments af-
fect economic growth over the 1870-1920 period only through their eﬀect on the
81870-1920 change in counties’ fractionalization and polarization. We examine
in our empirical analysis also formally the validity of our instrumental variables
by using the Hansen test of the overidentifying restrictions.
5 Main Results
Table 3 presents our baseline estimates of the average eﬀect that cultural frac-
tionalization and cultural polarization have on output growth. Column (1)
reports the state-ﬁxed eﬀects estimates for regressing the 1870-1920 log-change
of output per capita on the 1870-1920 change in the polarization index. The
result is a negative coeﬃcient on the polarization index that is statistically sig-
niﬁcant at the 10 percent level. In column (2) we repeat the regression for the
cultural fractionalization index and this produces a negative but statistically
insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient.
Results change somewhat when we include both, the fractionalization and
the polarization index on the right-hand side of the estimating equation. Column
(3) shows that in this case both the fractionalization and the polarization index
are statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. The estimated coeﬃcient
(s.e.) on the polarization index is -1.08 (0.41) and the estimated coeﬃcient (s.e.)
on the fractionalization index is 1.36 (0.72). Hence, the eﬀect of polarization
on economic growth remains signiﬁcantly negative, while the growth eﬀect of
cultural fractionalization becomes signiﬁcantly positive.11
In column (4) we introduce control variables that capture cross-county diﬀer-
ences in initial conditions, such as initial output per capita, the Gini coeﬃcient
of farm size distribution, the manufacturing share, the population size, rail ac-
cess, the share of foreign-born, and the population share of Afro-Americans.
Controlling for these variables substantially improves the explanatory power
of the econometric model: the adjusted R-squared increases from 0.27 in col-
umn (3) to 0.54 in column (4). And the signiﬁcance of the estimated eﬀect
of fractionalization and polarization on output growth increases so that both
point estimates on the fractionalization and polarization index are individually
signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
To correct for a possible endogeneity bias of our least-squares estimates,
we report in column (5) IV estimates that use the supply-push component of
immigrant inﬂows as an instrumental variable. The main result is that there
continues to be a signiﬁcant negative growth eﬀect of cultural polarization and
a signiﬁcant positive growth eﬀect of cultural fractionalization when using the
supply-push instrumental variables strategy. In terms of instrument quality, the
supply-push strategy yields a reasonable ﬁrst-stage F-statistic of 11.01 and the
Anderson-Rubin test rejects at the 1 percent level that the second-stage coef-
11We note here that it is important to include both fractionalization and polarization jointly
in the regression because these variables are positively correlated (see Section 3). Including
fractionalization (polarization) individually implies that the estimate suﬀers from a negative
(positive) omitted variables bias since in this case the right-hand side regressor is correlated
with the error term.
9ﬁcients are equal to zero. Quantitatively, the two-stage least squares estimates
imply that a 1 percentage point increase in cultural polarization signiﬁcantly
reduced output per capita by over 1.7 percent. A 1 percentage point increase
in cultural fractionalization signiﬁcantly increased output per capita by around
1.9 percent.
In column (6) we show that similar results are obtained when using instead of
the supply-push immigrant inﬂow instrument, counties’ initial level of fraction-
alization and polarization as an instrumental variable for the 1870-1920 period
change. This instrumental variables strategy, which exploits the signiﬁcant re-
version of the fractionalization and polarization measure to the mean produces
2SLS coeﬃcients on the polarization and fractionalization index of -2.5 and 2.3
respectively. Both 2SLS coeﬃcients are individually signiﬁcant at the 1 percent
level at least. The joint ﬁrst-stage F-statistic of the excluded instruments is
42.81 and thus easily exceeds the critical values tabulated in Stock and Yogo
(2005) for instruments to be declared as weak.
In order to formally test the validity of the instrumental variables in the
second-stage growth equation, we report in column (7) two-stage least squares
estimates that use both the supply-push and the initial fractionalization and
polarization index as instrumental variables. The Hansen test on the overiden-
tifying restriction produces a p-value of 0.79. Hence, the Hansen test does not
reject the null hypothesis that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated with
the second-stage error term.
As a further check on the robustness of the estimated average marginal eﬀect
that polarization and fractionalization has on output growth, Table 4 presents
least squares and instrumental variables estimates for diﬀerent time periods.
Our baseline regressions are for the period from 1870 to 1920 because our aim is
to examine the long-run eﬀect that changes in the cultural diversity of counties
had on output growth during the age of mass migration. To check whether our
results also hold when shortening the time span, Panel A of Table 4 presents
least squares and instrumental variables estimates for the 1880-1920 period,
Panel B presents estimates for the 1890-1920 period, and Panel C presents esti-
mates for the 1900-1920 period.12 The main result is that for these alternative
time periods cultural fractionalization has a positive eﬀect on output growth
and cultural polarization has a negative eﬀect. Statistically, the estimates are
signiﬁcant at conventional conﬁdence levels for the majority of the alternative
time periods.13 In Appendix Table 1, we also show that there continues to be a
negative average eﬀect of polarization on output growth and a positive average
eﬀect of fractionalization when excluding the Southern states (where output
growth and immigration on average was low and polarization was high) and
in Appendix Table 2 we show that our results are robust to controlling for a
nonlinear eﬀect of fractionalization.
12Because no manufacturing data are available for the 1910 US Census at the county level,
we are not able to examine the eﬀect for the 1910-1920 period.
13Least squares and instrumental variables estimates for the periods 1870-1880, 1870-1890
and 1870-1900 yielded qualitatively similar results, which are available from the authors upon
request.
10The economic history literature has often used as a proxy for economic
progress and development the growth rate of the share of people living in urban
regions. Although historically changes in output per capita and urbanization
might have been highly correlated, Table 5 shows that the results are actually
not as strong when we use instead of the output per capita growth rate the
change in the share of people living in urban regions. The estimated coeﬃ-
cients still show a positive eﬀect of fractionalization and in some speciﬁcations
a negative eﬀect of polarization. But, statistically the estimates are mostly in-
signiﬁcant. Given that output per capita can be much more readily related to
macroeconomic models with an aggregate production function than urbaniza-
tion rates, we are not too worried about the insigniﬁcance of the results. In fact,
one way of interpreting the insigniﬁcant results is that changes in the urbaniza-
tion rate are a very noisy proxy for economic growth and insigniﬁcant estimates
may therefore not necessarily mean that there is no signiﬁcant relationship be-
tween economic growth and cultural development.
An interesting issue that we can shed light on with our output per capita
data is whether the marginal eﬀect of polarization and fractionalization on eco-
nomic growth is particularly large in counties with initially high levels of output
per capita. Alesina and LaFerrara (2005) argued that the beneﬁts from variety
in skills are more likely to be relevant for more advanced societies. Columns
(1)-(4) of Table 6 show that consistent with the argument in Alesina and LaFer-
rara the positive marginal eﬀect of cultural fractionalization on output growth
is particularly large in counties with above median output per capita. In these
counties a 1 percentage point increase in cultural fractionalization increased
output per capita by up to 4.2 percent. Interestingly, for the above median per
capita output counties the negative eﬀect of polarization on output growth is
also particularly large. Columns (5)-(8) show on the other hand that quantita-
tively the eﬀect of fractionalization and polarization on output growth is much
smaller and statistically insigniﬁcant in the sample with below-median output
per capita.14
Table 7 presents evidence on an intermediate channel through which cultural
fractionalization may have a positive eﬀect on output growth: the diversity of
skills of the working-age population. To measure the diversity of skills of the
working-age population we constructed a fractionalization index of job occupa-
tions as OCCcs = 1 
PO
o=1 O2
ocs, where Oocs is the fraction of workers living in
US county c in state s that work in occupation o. Economically, this fraction-
alization index of job occupations captures the probability that two randomly
selected workers occupy a diﬀerent job. Columns (1)-(4) of Table 7 show that
once instrumental variables techniques are used there is a signiﬁcant positive av-
erage eﬀect of increases in cultural fractionalization on the fractionalization of
job occupations. To reinforce this result we also built another fractionalization
measure which captures the probability that two randomly selected individuals
work in a diﬀerent industry. Analog to the fractionalization index of job oc-
14In Appendix Table 3 we show that we obtain similar results when splitting countries into
above and below median manufacturing GDP per capita. Appendix Table 3 hence conﬁrms
that the positive eﬀect of diversity on output works also through manufacturing.




where Imcs is the fraction of workers living in US county c in state s that work
in industry m. The estimates of columns (5)-(8) indicate that changes in cul-
tural fractionalization are positively associated with changes in the industry
diversity index. Hence, both results are consistent with the argument in the
cultural economics literature that cultural diversity may have a positive eﬀect
on output per capita because it increases the variety of skills, and therefore, the
variety of goods and services that are produced in an economy (e.g. Alesina and
LaFerrera, 2005).
We also explore the product diversity channel more directly by construct-
ing a fractionalization measure of agricultural diversity as AGRDIVcs = 1   PA
a=1 G2
acs, where Gacs is the county product share of good a produced in
county c of state s.15 This fractionalization index captures a county’s agricul-
tural production structure and is maximized if a county is completely diversiﬁed.
Columns (9)-(12) show that increases in the cultural fractionalization of coun-
ties were positively associated with a greater variety of agricultural products
once instrumental variable techniques are used. These results are yet further
evidence that cultural fractionalization fosters economic growth through the
product diversity channel.
The conﬂict literature has argued that increases in cultural polarization may
be associated with increases in conﬂict potential.16 To explore this channel
empirically with our data we present in columns (1)-(4) of Table 8 estimates
of the eﬀect that changes in cultural fractionalization and cultural polarization
have on changes in the share of people that work in jobs related to crime delicts
(policemen, ﬁremen, guards, lawyers, undertakers, sheriﬀs and marshals). Due
to demand eﬀects, it is plausible that the fraction of people which are employed
in jobs related to crime delicts is larger, the stronger the underlying conﬂict
potential in the county. We also explore the conﬂict channel more directly by
presenting in columns (5)-(8) estimates of the eﬀect that changes in cultural
fractionalization and cultural polarization have on changes in the number of
riots. Consistent with the recent conﬂict literature that has emphasized cultural
polarization rather than cultural fractionalization to increase the intensity of
conﬂict, we ﬁnd that more cultural polarization increased the share of people
that worked in jobs related to crime delicts, and that more cultural polarization
also increased the number of riots in US counties. Importantly, our estimates
are statistically signiﬁcant when we use instrumental variables estimation to
correct for potential endogeneity biases.
To document the signiﬁcant mean-reversion of the fractionalization and po-
larization index, Panel A and Panel B of Table 9 show the ﬁrst-stage estimates
where the 1870-1920 change in the fractionalization and polarization index is
regressed on the initial 1870 value. The estimated coeﬃcient on the initial
polarization index in Panel A is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1
percent level. Hence, counties that had relatively high levels of polarization
15See also the Data Appendix A3 for further details.
16See e.g. Esteban and Ray (1999, 2010) or Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005b).
12in 1870 experienced smaller changes over the 1870-1920 period in polarization
than counties that started out with relatively low levels of polarization. Panel
B shows that there was also signiﬁcant reversion to the mean in the fraction-
alization index. Even though we do not oﬀer here an economic explanation for
the mean-reversion in the polarization and fractionalization index, we note that
statistically the mean-reverting nature of the polarization and fractionalization
index follows from the boundedness of these indices on the unit interval.
An important implication of the signiﬁcant mean-reversion in the polariza-
tion and fractionalization index is that the reduced form eﬀect of initial polar-
ization and initial fractionalization on economic growth has the opposite sign
than a two-stage least squares estimate, where the change in polarization and
fractionalization is instrumented by the initial value. We show this in Panel
C, where the growth rate of output per capita is regressed on the initial values
of polarization and fractionalization. The result is that the reduced form co-
eﬃcients have exactly the opposite sign than what the two-stage least squares
estimates revealed in the previous tables. The reason for the discrepancy is
that the two-stage least squares estimates, via the ﬁrst-stage, fully take into ac-
count the mean-reversion of the polarization and fractionalization index while
the reduced form regression misses this information. For empirical research
purposes, we therefore note that using initial measures of fractionalization and
polarization in a reduced form regression can produce confounding results.
6 Further Issues
6.1 Group Aggregation
A further issue in our empirical analysis is the level of aggregation of the cul-
tural groups. In contrast to cross-country studies that use measures of ethnic
fractionalization, our analysis of the eﬀects of cultural diversity is based on well-
deﬁned groups: immigrants’ country of origin. By using immigrants’ country of
origin to construct the cultural diversity measures, our empirical analysis codes
cultural groups at a fairly disaggregated level. To check on the importance of
disaggregation, we report in Table 10 estimates when we do not distinguish im-
migrants by country of origin; i.e. when we pool all immigrants into one group
so that the fractionalization and the polarization index is based on three groups
only: native whites, Afro-Americans, and foreign-born. One disadvantage in
terms of identiﬁcation is that pooling immigrants into one group impedes ex-
ploiting network eﬀects to compute the supply-push component of immigrant
inﬂows. This is because network eﬀorts are speciﬁc to immigrants’ country of
origin. We report in Table 10 therefore instrumental variables estimates that
use the initial fractionalization and polarization measures to predict the 1870-
1920 change (since we cannot use the supply push component as an instrumental
variable when we pool immigrants into one group). We also report least-squares
estimates.
The main result is that the sign of the estimated coeﬃcients is similar to the
13sign of the coeﬃcients that we report in the other tables where we distinguish
immigrants by country of origin. Statistically and quantitatively the eﬀects of
fractionalization and polarization are however much weaker when we pool im-
migrants into one group. This should not be surprising if an expectedly large
share of the variation in product variety and conﬂict tensions comes from dif-
ferences between immigrants, as indeed the anecdotal evidence that we provide
in Appendix A1 suggests. When we pool immigrants into one group, these dif-
ferences are ignored and hence the eﬀects of fractionalization and polarization
are quantitatively and statistically weaker.
6.2 Group Distances
In this section we address the issue that our polarization and fractionalization
indices are based on the binary criteria of "belonging" or "not belonging" to a
particular cultural group. Because using such a discrete metric (belonging/not
belonging) implies that the distance across cultural groups is the same, it is the
size of each group that matters for our indices. For our research purposes, we
believe that it is reasonable to rely on this binary criteria of "belonging" or "not
belonging to", because we distinguish cultural groups by the country of origin.
We would like to point out that our discrete polarization measure is related
to Esteban and Ray’s (1994) class of polarization measures for variables that
have a continuous dimension. The measurability of inter-group distances on the
real line complicates the application of Esteban and Ray’s (1994) polarization
measure, since it is not obvious how to map accurately inter-group distances on
to the real line.
Fearon (2003) and more recently Desmet et al. (2009a) and Esteban et al.
(2010) try to tackle this measurement issue by proxying inter-group distances
with linguistic distances. To see what we would obtain if we were to follow
their approach, we report in Table 11 the results for constructing the fractional-
ization and polarization index based on linguistic distances.17 Columns (1)-(4)
show that polarization has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on output, and that frac-
tionalization has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect. Hence, we continue to obtain our
main result that, increases in cultural polarization have a negative output eﬀect
while increases in fractionalization have a positive output eﬀect. Importantly,
columns (5)-(8) document that the polarization index continues to have a neg-
ative eﬀect when we add a quadratic term of the fractionalization index to the
right-hand side of the estimating equation.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we investigated the impact that cultural diversity had on eco-
nomic growth by exploiting the wave of mass immigration to the US during
the 1870-1920 period as a plausibly exogenous source of variation in cultural
17See the note to Table 11 for details on how exactly these indices are constructed.
14diversity. As immigrants ﬂocked from European countries to the US the cul-
tural composition of the US population changed signiﬁcantly. We showed that
increases in the cultural fractionalization of US counties signiﬁcantly increased
output per capita, while increases in the cultural polarization had a signiﬁcant
negative output eﬀect. Our ﬁnding that increases in cultural fractionalization
signiﬁcantly increased output per capita is consistent with the argument in the
cultural economics literature that greater diversity of the population increases
output per capita due to greater variety of workers’ skills and a greater variety
of goods and services. On the other hand, our ﬁnding that increases in cultural
polarization signiﬁcantly decreased output per capita is consistent with the con-
ﬂict literature that has emphasized the negative, socially destabilizing eﬀect of
cultural polarization. An important implication of the ﬁndings in our paper is
that it is crucial to distinguish between fractionalization and polarization when
examining empirically the eﬀects that cultural diversity has on economic growth.
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19Appendix
A1. Anecdotal Evidence
Diversity of the Workforce
During the 1870-1920 period, the occupational distribution reveals a striking
pattern of occupational clustering by nationalities (Hutchinson, 1956).18 As
Kim (2007, pp. 17-18) pointed out:
The Germans specialized in many food related industries as brewers, dis-
tillers, butchers and confectioners ... The Irish were highly specialized
in gas works and other heavy industries ... The English and Welsh were
concentrated in textiles, iron and steel ... The Scandinavians were highly
specialized in a few occupations: sail and awning makers and those re-
lated to lumber industry.
The occupational clustering by nationalities provides evidence in support of
the product variety channel of cultural diversity emphasized by Alesina and La
Ferrara (2005), and is in line with our empirical ﬁndings of Table 7 (Section 5,
page 11).
Cultural Polarization
Social tensions among European immigrants were not rare in the US during
the 19th century. Antagonism between Europeans that was due to the rise of
nationalism in 19th century Europe, was at least in part imported to the US
by the large inﬂow of European immigrants. The following examples illustrate
some of the cultural conﬂicts among European immigrants in the US during the
1870-1920 period.
In 1868 the The New York Times reported a riot between German and Irish
immigrants that ended up with thirty men wounded and sixty arrested by the
police at Ward’s Island, New York. The dispute between the Irish and Germans
started, when "the contestants used vile epithets toward each other’s national-
ity".19 Another riot took place in Scranton, Pennsylvania, 1871 among Welsh,
Irish and German coal miners. Violence occurred among the strike members
when German and Irish miners were attacked by Welsh strikers.20 In Pittsburg,
Pennsylvania, 1886 a conﬂict between Irish and Italian laborers – residing in
the same neighborhood – arose, "in which two of the participants received fatal
injuries".21 A severe ﬁght among Swedish, Polish and Hungarian immigrants
in Denver, Colorado, 1887 resulted in one man being shot and several others
18See Kim (2007) for a detailed descriptive statistic on occupational clustering of foreign-
born worker by nationalities for the years 1870 and 1890.
19The New York Times, published: March 6, 1868 as "Riot on Ward’s Island".
20The New York Times, published: May 11, 1871 as "The Coal Riot".
21The New York Times, published: September 20, 1886 as "Fatal War Among Races".
20seriously wounded.22 In 1915, a clash between Italians and Austrians occurred
at the Federal Pressed Steel Company in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Seven men
were hurt after the Austrian steel workers left because the workers discovered
that they were hired by the company to keep up with orders for shrapnel which
were sold to Russia.23
A2. Simulation
To illustrate and provide some intuition for the relationship between the frac-
tionalization and polarization index, we simulated data on the population share
of n groups by drawing n times from a uniform [0,1] distribution and dividing
each draw by the total size of the realizations drawn. We repeated this 1000
times, constructing at each replication the fractionalization and polarization in-
dex. Appendix Figure 1 shows the results for n = 3;4;5;6;7. The key message
is that, when the number of groups is small the polarization and fractionaliza-
tion index are positively correlated and as the number of groups increase the
correlation turns negative.24
A3. Data Appendix
Our main data source is the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social
Research (ICPSR) 2896 data ﬁle. The ICPSR 2896 data ﬁle contains detailed
decennial county and state level data on demographic, economic, and social
variables which were collected by the U.S. Bureau of Census for the period
1790-2000.25 One key advantage of the ICPSR data set is that it enables us to
exploit the underlying cultural heterogeneity in the United States at the county
level. In particular, the ICPSR data set comprises – from 1870 onwards – de-
tailed information about the country of origin of foreign-born, white US-born
citizens and Afro-Americans which is necessary to calculate the cultural diver-
sity indices described in Section 4.
As a further database, we use the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series
(IPUMS-USA) which consists of more than ﬁfty high-precision samples of the
American population drawn from ﬁfteen federal censuses and from the Ameri-
can Community Surveys of 2000-2008. The IPUMS is composed of micro-data,
where each record is a person, with all characteristics numerically coded. In most
samples persons are organized into households, making it possible to study the
characteristics of people in the context of their families or other co-residents.
These samples, which draw on every surviving census from 1850-2000, and the
22The New York Times, published: April 12, 1887 as "A Race Riot in Denver".
23The New York Times, published: August 16, 1915 as "Seven Hurt in Race Riot".
24We did not show the results for n = 2 because in this case the fractionalization and
polarization index are exactly the same (see Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a,b)).
25More information about the data set (i.e. scope of study, data collection and data source)
can be found at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/02896.
212000-2008 ACS samples, collectively constitute a rich source of quantitative in-
formation on long-term changes in the American population.26 The IPUMS
gives us the possibility to exploit individual level data and construct aggregate
data at the county level whenever these variables are missing in the ICSPR data
set, but available at the IPUMS. In particular, we used the IPUMS database to
construct our fractionalization index of job occupations, the industry diversity
index and the share of people that work in jobs related to crime delicts (see
Section 5). The IPUMS benchmark occupation classiﬁcation variable occ1950
which assigns an occupation code to the individual’s reported occupation is
used to construct the fractionalization index of job occupations and the share
of people that work in jobs related to crime delicts. To build our industry di-
versity index, we exploit the IPUMS benchmark industry classiﬁcation variable
ind1950, which contains coded information about the industry in which an in-
dividual performed an occupation.27
Our source for the number of riots in 1870 and 1920 is the historical violence
database (HVD).28 The dataset reports detailed information on riots (year, kills,
location and a further description of each riot) in the United States from colo-
nial times to the present. Although the database reports the location (usually
either the city, town or county) of the riots, we had to compile for each loca-
tion the corresponding (ICSPR) county code (if the information on the location
was precise enough) to make the data source for our analysis compatible. The
following table provides a detailed description of the variables used in our em-
pirical analysis (if not further speciﬁed, variables are selected from the ICSPR
2896 data ﬁle):
26The IPUMS is a public project and data are freely available. For more information see:
http://usa.ipums.org/usa/index.shtml.
27The occupation classiﬁcation code of 1950 is a reference for all Census occupation
data available at the IPUMS. Census years with diﬀerent occupation coding schemes (as
the 1870 and 1920 Census) are converted by the IPUMS into the occupation classiﬁca-
tion of 1950 (i.e. the variable occ1950) to make occupations over time comparable. The
same applies to the IPUMS industrial classiﬁcation variable ind1950. More information
about the creation of both variables ind1950 and occ1950 is provided by the IPUMS at
http://usa.ipums.org/usa/index.shtml.
28The HVD is a public project and data are freely available. For more information see:
http://cjrc.osu.edu/researchprojects/hvd/usa/riots/ and Roth et al. (2008).
22DEPENDENT VARIABLES
VARIABLE YEARS DESCRIPTION
Output growth 1870 - 1920 Total output in per capita terms is formed as the sum
of manufacturing output and agricultural output. The
growth variable is calculated as the change in logarithmic
units.
Manufacturing Output 1870 - 1920 Manufacturing output is in per capita terms. For 1910,
there are no manufacturing Census data available at the
county level.
Agricultural Output 1870 - 1920 Agricultural output is in per capita terms. For 1870 we
use the variable "farmout", which contains the estimated
value of farm products. For 1920 we add the values of
crops, cereals, other grains and seeds, hay and forage,
vegetables, fruits and all other crops reported in the IC-
SPR 2896 data ﬁle.
Urban growth 1870 - 1920 Change in the population share living in urban counties.
The Census declared a county population as urban, if at




1870 - 1920 We take the occupation variable occ1950 from the
IPUMS to construct the occupational diversity index.




1870 - 1920 We take the industry classiﬁcation variable ind1950 from
the IPUMS to construct the industry diversity index. See





1870 - 1920 We use the following agricultural goods for our index:
wheat, rye, corn, oats, barley, buckwheat, peas and
beans, potato, sweet potato, emmer and spelt, kaﬁr corn,
soybeans and peanuts which are all measured in bushels.
These agricultural goods are reported in the ICSPR 2896
data ﬁle Part 47 (1870) and Part 86 (1920). See the ﬁrst




1870 - 1920 We consider the following occupations as related to crime
delicts: sheriﬀs, marshals, policemen, ﬁremen, guards,
undertaker and lawyers. These occupations are listed
in the Census occupational classiﬁcation system of 1950
and reported by the IPUMS, separately (see variable
occ1950). We group these occupations together and cal-
culate the corresponding share as occupations related to
crime delicts out of the total workforce.
Change in Number of
Riots




Land Concentration 1870 Gini coeﬃcient of farm size distribution, calculated as in
Galor et al. (2009, p. 175).
Manufacturing Share 1870 Share of manufacturing output over the sum of manufac-
turing and agricultural output in 1870.
Population 1870 Total population in US counties in 1870.
Rail Access 1870 Indicator variable that is equal to one if a county has
access to a railroad within its borders in 1870, and zero
otherwise. See Atack et al. (2008) for more information
on the construction of the railroad data set.
Share of Foreign-Born 1870 Share of foreign-born out of the total population in 1870.
Share of
Afro-Americans
1870 Share of Afro-Americans (declared by the historical US
Census as negro population) out of the total population
in 1870.
25Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Annual Immigration as a Fraction of the US Population, 1820 - 2000
Source: Historical Statistics of the United States (Barde et al., 2006), Statistical
Abstract of the US, eh.net database and Kim (Figure 3, 2007).
26Figure 2: Fractionalization vs. Polarization
Figure 2A: Year 1870
Figure 2B: Year 1920
27Table I
Foreign-Born Descriptive Statistics (1870 - 1920)
STANDARD DEVIATION
VARIABLES Mean Min Max Overall Between Within
Foreign-Born (FB), (overall) 0.10 0.00 1.00 0.12 0.11 0.04
FB in the West 0.19 0.00 0.95 0.11 0.09 0.06
FB in the Midwest 0.15 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.12 0.06
FB in the Northeast 0.15 0.00 0.54 0.10 0.09 0.04
FB in the South 0.02 0.00 0.45 0.05 0.05 0.02
Afro-Americans, (overall) 0.13 0.00 1.00 0.21 0.20 0.03
White US-Born, (overall) 0.76 0.00 1.00 0.19 0.19 0.05
28Table II





th Percentile West South Midwest Northeast
1870 0.3302 0.1793 0.4818 0.4161 0.3491 0.3055 0.2539
1880 0.3138 0.1700 0.4635 0.3899 0.3313 0.2919 0.2394
1890 0.3153 0.1674 0.4661 0.3719 0.3202 0.3044 0.2672
1900 0.2901 0.1419 0.4393 0.3172 0.3105 0.2611 0.2682
1910 0.2877 0.1342 0.4339 0.3214 0.3022 0.2480 0.3303
1920 0.2572 0.1120 0.4025 0.2540 0.2940 0.1973 0.3048





th Percentile West South Midwest Northeast
1870 0.5633 0.3319 0.7967 0.5660 0.6668 0.4680 0.4188
1880 0.5442 0.3165 0.7682 0.5590 0.6367 0.4607 0.3989
1890 0.5344 0.3098 0.7404 0.5268 0.6124 0.4677 0.4247
1900 0.5065 0.2657 0.7205 0.4766 0.5975 0.4214 0.4209
1910 0.5003 0.2540 0.7074 0.4772 0.5821 0.4015 0.4975
1920 0.4595 0.2129 0.6676 0.4052 0.5681 0.3332 0.4692















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































38Appendix Tables and Figures
Appendix Figure 1: Fractionalization (y-axis) vs. Polarization (x-axis)
(a) Number of groups = 3 (b) Number of groups = 4
(c) Number of groups = 5 (d) Number of groups = 6
(e) Number of groups = 7
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